Kemalism revisited

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Abstract

Kemalism is a topic that occupies national and international historiography and provokes fruitful and controversial debates. This paper has four objectives: firstly, to place Kemalism in its historical context; secondly, to discuss whether Kemalism was an ideological continuation of the Unionists and to review the ideological programme of the Kemalist administration; thirdly, to discuss the political structure of the Kemalist administration; and fourthly, to characterize the Kemalist administration in socio-economic terms. The paper argues that Turkey experienced a double revolution during the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. On the question of ideological continuity of the Unionists, the paper stresses both continuity and departure. On the political structure, the paper suggests that during the Kemalist era, power was concentrated in the hands of a few leading military-civilian bureaucrats, and thus the political structure was authoritarian, although it should be stressed that Kemalists retained essential institutions of representative democracy. In terms of the socio-economic characterization of the Kemalist administration, the paper argues that it was a coalition of military-civilian bureaucrats within which the disagreements occurred. The paper concludes that Kemalism was a national response aimed at bringing Turkey into the modern state-system.

Key words: Kemalism, ideology, six arrows, Gökalp, Akçura, double revolution, development strategy in Turkey.

1. Introduction

Kemalism is the ideology of the founders of the Turkish Republic. What is Kemalism? How to read it? Questions such as these have been the subject of a great deal of academic research, and while there is no doubt that they have contributed a great deal, there is still a need for further investigation. The aim of this article is,
first, to locate Kemalism in its historical context; second, to address the question of whether Kemalism was an ideological continuation of the Unionists and where departures can be discerned; third, to characterise the Kemalist administration in terms of its political structure; and fourth, to characterise the Kemalist administration in socio-economic terms.

2. Historical context of a double revolution

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Turkey experienced a double revolution. The first aspect of the revolution was the War of Liberation, fought between 1919 and 1922, with the aim of securing Turkish territory against the ambitions of the Armenian and Greek forces, and to defend Turkish independence and sovereignty against the imperialist powers Britain, France and Italy, which had emerged victorious from the world war. The success of the Turkish War of Liberation was crowned by the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, which gave international recognition to an independent and sovereign Turkey in undisputed possession of Anatolia and Thrace, leaving the Mosul problem as the only substantial outstanding territorial issue. The Treaty of Lausanne also abolished most of the privileges and rights of interference that the major European powers had enjoyed in the now defunct Ottoman Empire: most importantly, the capitulations, i.e. the commercial and legal concessions, were abolished, the responsibility for administering the Ottoman public debt, created in 1881, was transferred to the Turkish government, and it was agreed that Turkey would regain full tariff autonomy after five years. Finally, a separate agreement providing for a compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece freed Turkey from the actual threat of Greek irredentism.

Certainly, the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 did not settle all outstanding disputes between Turkey and the other signatories. The issues of Mosul (between Turkey and Britain), the Turkish-Syrian border dispute (between Turkey and France), the Ottoman debt (between Turkey and several Western states), the population exchange (between Turkey and Greece), the nationalisation of foreign investments in Turkey and the status of foreign schools in Turkey remained unresolved. Moreover, the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty’s Straits Convention had put a question mark over Turkish-Soviet relations, which had been very friendly since the signing of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty in March 1921.

These problems were to be tackled from 1924 to 1939: In 1926 a settlement was reached on Mosul problem at the expense of Turkey while the Hatay issue would be settled down in favour of Turkey in 1939 (Soysal, 1983). The status of foreign schools in Turkey would be dealt with when the Kemalist government enacted the law for the unification of education in 1924 that all schools were to
enter under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. In 1925 Kemalist government nationalized some of monopolies, which had been under foreign companies, particularly the tobacco monopoly and some rail lines, they were to be properly addressed when they worked out the étatist economic development policy in 1932. Following the 1929 world economic depression, İnönü government forced the debtors to renegotiate the total amount of Ottoman public debt, which had been negotiated and finalized by Ali Fethi Okyar in 1925. A new treaty was concluded in December 1932, reducing the total amount from 107 million gold lira to 8.6 million, which would be paid off by 1954 (Türkeş, 1993: 69). In 1930, Turkey and Greece agreed to authorize their governments to address the property problems left over from the compulsory population exchange (Türkeş, 1999: 16) and thus, it was removed from the list of remaining problems.

The second aspect of the Turkish Revolution was domestic. The War of Liberation was directed not by the Ottoman Sultan’s government in İstanbul, but by a rebel government set up at Ankara by a group of military-civil bureaucrats, whose leader was Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), a former army officer, who would transform the organization called the “Association for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia” into a political party, the People’s Party, on 9 September 1923, which later took the name the Republican People’s Party (RPP). Ankara’s victory in the War of Liberation meant final defeat of the remnants of the Ottoman rulers, and opened the way to radical political changes: by 1925 both the Sultanate (1 November 1922) and the Caliphate (3 March 1924) had been abolished, and the dynasty expelled (3-6 March 1924), Turkey had been proclaimed a republic (29 October 1923), Ankara had become the capital (13 October 1923), and the republican administration had embarked upon a radical program of secularization. With the exception of the Mevlevi Dervishes and the Bektashi Lodges, other sects were banned. The aim of this decision was to minimise the political power of the local and provincial leaders of the sects, the sheikhs, who had built up their local political power. The political power of the local and provincial sheikhs was based on the material support recruited through the foundations. The sheikhs relied on the rules laid down by the founder of the foundation and the lodges as a rule that could never be changed. At first this seemed to contribute to pluralism, but in the end each sect produced a single ideology and failed even to improve its own ideology. The result was the reproduction of so many singular ideologies and thus educational and cultural stagnation. Laws such as the Law for Unification of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) and the closure of sects were a step towards preparing the ground for fundamental educational, cultural and social reforms.

All these political decisions were legalised through the enactment of laws in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. It is true that in most cases the reform issues were taken up by a small number of journalists, academics and intellectuals who
were invited to dinners at Çankaya Köşkü, the presidential palace. But the final decision was always taken in the national parliament.

2.1. The legitimacy earned

How was it possible for a small number of military-civil bureaucratic leadership who successfully achieved such a transition from the long-lasted Sultanate (1299 to 1922) to the Republic of Turkey?

Two factors were effective in the success of this double revolution. First is the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Like the other empires, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved at the end of the First World War. Although the Turkish army fought at nine different fronts at the time of the First World War and did its best to keep the largest portion of the land, however, in the end, the Ottoman Empire was defeated, partitioned, and divided into spheres of influence. The imperial superstructure was dissolved. This was the actual situation. What might come out of remnants of the empire was a big question mark. The second factor was the leadership of the response to such question. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultanate did not take up the leadership of resistance against the imperialist actors' plans that had envisaged to share the Ottoman lands and furthermore when the Greek forces occupied İzmir, the Sultanate did not do anything more than issuing an official notam that protested the British commander, while the military-civilian bureaucrats, led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), who would later be called Kemalists, embarked the resistance in 1919 and organized national congresses in Erzurum (23 July to 7 August 1919) and Sivas (4-11 September 1919), and carried out nationwide elections despite the actual conflict continued, to hold the Grand National Assembly, which was opened in Ankara, on 23 April 1920, and finally achieved driving occupiers out of Anatolia by September 1922. During this process, the Sultanate discredited itself and thus lost its legitimacy as it failed to take up the leadership to defend its own sovereignty and the independence of the country. Kemalists, on the other hand, took up the leadership and successfully brought diversified resistance groups together, unifying them under a national army, fought against Armenians in the Eastern front and turned against the Greek forces in the Western front as well as resisting against the political pressures of British, French and Italian imperialists and their proxies. The Kemalist leadership earned the legitimacy as they conducted a successful War of Liberation. When on 1 November 1922 Kemalists enacted in the Grand National Assembly the law for the abolition of the Sultanate, apart from a small group of press in İstanbul, no one challenged such a decision because the legitimacy had been earned by Kemalists through the leadership of the War of Liberation and the timing of Sultanate’s abolition was so perfect as the invitation letter to upcoming international conference in Lausanne, issued by the British government, invited both Ankara (the Grand
National Assembly) and İstanbul (Sultanate) governments at the same time. Mustafa Kemal acted at the right time and right place to abolish the Sultanate on 1 November 1922. The Kemalist leaders earned the legitimacy and set the stage for further ideological and socio-economic reforms that opened the terrain for further struggle at the domestic level with the remnants of the Ottoman social relations (Türkeş, 1999: 15-46).

3. Ideological continuity or its own ideological programme


[Gökalp’s ideas] were more amply implemented under the single-party rule (1920-1945) of the first generation of Kemalists, whom Gökalp joined and fully endorsed. … Gökalp’s corporatist thinking has provided the paradigmatic world view for the several dominant political ideologies and public philosophies in Turkey; and that, more specifically, Unionism (1908-1918) and Kemalism (1923-1950) as singular official ideologies, as well as contemporary Kemalism(s) (1960-1980), are but programmatic and, in the narrow sense, ideological variations of his inclusive system.

No doubt Gökalp’s ideas were well-known to the Kemalist leadership as they had been brought up in a nationalist discourse raised by the publication of Turkish Fatherland, (Türk Yurdu) journal, whose main editors were Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura. However, it has to be kept in mind that Gökalp had been kept at arm’s length by Kemalists up to his death in 1924. Gökalp had been detained by the British in Malta from 1920 to the spring of 1921, and then returned to his hometown, Diyarbakır, where he remained until late 1922. Although in late 1922 he was invited to Ankara to organise the Department of Publication and Translation in the Ministry of Education, and was elected to the parliament in April 1923, he was given no other influential official position, nor encouraged to undertake a task of formulating an ideology for Kemalists. Even the publication of his book The Principles of Turcism, (Türkçülüğün Esasları) in 1923, which can be said to have put forward an ideological interpretation of Kemalism, brought him no official recognition as an ideologist of Kemalism.

I argue that a close comparison between the ideas of Gökalp and those of Kemalists reveals real divergence on several important issues. Gökalp’s activity as
an ideologist went back as far back as 1908, but most authorities agree that it was Durkheim’s sociology, and, in particular, Durkheim’s solidarism, which from 1912 exercised the greatest influence on Gökalp’s thinking. In his 1923 work, The Principles of Turkism, Gökalp recapitulated his earlier views on solidarism, as well as touching upon other ideological issues, such as populism, secularism and Marxism, and also calling for reforms in many spheres of social life.

Gökalp applied a simple method, based upon the reciprocity of opposites, such as culture vs civilisation, elite vs people, Ottomans vs Turks, eastern vs western cultures, homogeneity vs cosmopolitanism, national vs international. Gökalp tried to interpret, what he called these antitheses, in the context of Turkish-Islamic traditions, with a particular emphasis upon moral values. It is true that Gökalp (1968: 63-66) made reference to the solidarist views, which he had taken up from Durkheim, but, here, Gökalp put emphasis on morality and national solidarity.

It is also true that the İzmir Economic Congress of 1923 was organised on the basis of occupational representation, of industrialists, traders, farmers and workers, which seemingly reflects a solidarist view. However, there is no direct evidence to suggest that the ideas of either Durkheim or Gökalp influenced the organizers of the İzmir Congress, and it should be stressed that after the İzmir Economic Congress, occupational representation was never again practiced in Turkey, though the Kemalist leadership continued to repeat solidarist rhetoric in the following years. As will be seen below, Article 2 of the RPP Programme of 1931 reflects solidarist views, but, like Gökalp, it put the emphasis on nationalism.

As to populism, Gökalp (1968: 34-35) notes:

One of the basic tenets of Turkism is towards the people (halka doğru). ... What does ‘going to the people’ mean? Who are to go to them? The elite of any nation are its intellectuals and thinkers, those who are set apart from the common people by reasons of their superior education and learning. They are the ones who must go to the people. …

… The elite possess civilisation, the people culture. Therefore, there can only be two reasons for the elite to go to the people: (1) to receive a cultural education from them, and (2) to carry civilisation to them. Those are indeed the reasons, for the elite can find culture nowhere but among the people. Thus, to speak of ‘going to the people’ means ‘going to culture’, because the people are … our national culture.

… The old Ottoman elite disdained the peasant as a ‘stupid Turk;’ the Anatolian townsman was labelled with the epithet of târalî (provincial); the title given to the general public was avam. The havas were the Ottoman elite, which included only the slaves of the court.
It is conceivable that Gökcalp had borrowed the slogan ‘towards the people’ from the Russian narodniks of the 1870s, who had used it to express the idea of ‘the ‘debt’ that the educated classes, the intellectuals, owed to the people’ (Venturi, 1960: 469). This ethical spirit, the idea of duty, was also expressed by Gökcalp, but once again, Gökcalp put emphasis on the reciprocity of opposites, between elite and people, as if they were necessarily two opposing units. In contrast to Gökcalp, Kemalists did not put the emphasis on differences between elite and people, and its own populism, as will be seen below, focused on the duties and rights of citizens and the state.

Gökcalp (1968: 28) applied the same logic of opposites to another pair of concepts, ‘ruling cosmopolitan Ottoman class’ versus ‘ruled Turkish class’:

Why are these two coeval patterns, Turkish and Ottoman, so diametrically opposed to each other? Why is everything Turkish so beautiful and everything Ottoman so ugly? The reason is that the Ottoman pattern travelled the road of imperialism, which was so detrimental to Turkish culture and life. It was cosmopolitan and placed class interests above national interests. As the Ottoman Empire expanded and took under its political hegemony hundreds of nations, the rulers and the ruled became two entirely different classes. The ruling cosmopolitans became the Ottoman class and the ruled Turks the Turkish class. The two classes did not love each other. The Ottoman class regarded itself as the superior nation and viewed as a subject nation the Turks whom it ruled.

Kemalists did not argue in this sense, though they did seek to distance themselves from the Ottoman past, in terms which, as will be seen below, resembled those employed by Akçura.

Gökcalp (1968: 122-124) also sought to define a concept of ‘Economic Turkism’:

The task of Turkish economists is, first, to study the economic reality of Turkey and, second, to formulate on the basis of their objective studies a scientific and fundamental program for our national economy. Once this program has been formulated, every individual must work within its framework to create large industry in our country. The Ministry of Economy must exercise a general supervision over individual efforts.

There is no hint here of the étatism which would be adopted by the Kemalist administration in the 1930s. Rather, Gökcalp advocates protectionism and the need for industrialization. These subjects had been debated during the Unionist period. While Cavit Bey, Minister of Finance in 1908 had argued for an economic policy based on free trade and the theory of comparative advantage, others such as Musa Mehmetcanoğlu Akyiğitzade and Kırkör Zohrap Efendi had argued for
protectionism and industrialization (Toprak, 1982: 106-122). Gökalp brought nothing new to these discussions.

A further antithesis developed by Gökalp (1968: 22-23) was that between culture and civilisation:

There is both similarity and difference between culture and civilisation. The similarity is that both encompass all aspects of social life religious, moral, legal, intellectual, aesthetic, economic, linguistic and technologic. The sum total of these eight kinds of social life is called both culture and civilisation and thus provides the point of similarity and identity between the two.

… First of all, culture is national, whereas civilisation is international. Culture is a harmonious whole of the above-mentioned aspects of the life of a single nation. Civilisation, on the other hand, is a mutually shared whole of the social lives of many nations situated on the same continent ...

Secondly, civilisation is the sum total of social phenomena that have occurred by conscious action and individual wills. ... The elements included in culture, however, have not been created by conscious action and individual wills. They are not artificial. ... Civilisation is the sum total concepts and techniques created consciously and transmitted from one nation to another by imitation. Culture, however, consists of sentiments which cannot be created artificially and cannot be borrowed from other nations through imitation.

In contrast to Gökalp, the Kemalist leadership did not regard culture and civilisation as two different things. More important, while Gökalp included Islamic tradition into his definition of culture, the Kemalist leadership turned to construct a secular state and society.

A final point of difference lay in Gökalp’s (1968: 17-19) commitment to Turanism:

To understand the differences between Turkism and Turanism, it is necessary to delineate the borders of the Turkish and Turanian groups. Turks is the name of a nation, and a nation can be defined as a group which possesses a culture peculiar to itself. Therefore, a Turk can have only one language, only a single culture. Some branches of Turks, however, are trying to create a language and culture which differ from those of the Turks of Anatolia. Some young Northern Turks, for example, are now engaged in creating a Tatar language and culture. This movement, if successful, will result in the Turks being one nation and the Tatar another. We are too far away to know what course the Kirghiz and Uzbeks are following; but if they too should create separate languages, literature and cultures, the borders of the Turkish nation will have been further compressed...... Today, the Turks for whom culture unification would be easy are the Oghuz Turks, that is, the Turkmens, for the Turkmens of Azerbaijan, Iran and Khwarizm, like the Turks of Turkey, belong to the
Oghuz strain. Therefore, our immediate ideal for Turkism must be Oghuz, or Turkmen, unity. What would be the purpose of this unity? A political union? For the present, no! We cannot pass judgement today on what will happen in the future, but for the present our goal is only cultural unity of the Oghuz peoples..... Thus, the regions of Khwarizm, Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkey are, in an ethnographic sense, the homelands of the same people. We can call the totality of these four regions Oghuzistan. The immediate objective of Turkism is the dominance of a single culture throughout this great expanse. ... The long-range ideal of Turkism is Turan ...[in other words] Greater Turkistan, which includes all branches of Turks.

In contrast, the Kemalist leadership abandoned Turanism and Gökalp’s version of Turkism, in favour of creating a Turkish nation-state within the territorial borders defined by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.

In view of these divergences, it is evidently misleading to argue that Gökalp’s views were “amply implemented” by Kemalists.

The second ideologue of the Unionist era to be considered here is Yusuf Akçura, by origin a Volga Tatar from the Russian Empire. Akçura first came to notice in 1904, when he published an article entitled “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Types Policy) (Akçura, 2019). In his article, Akçura contrasted the three policies of Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Turkism (to which he gave a Pan-Turanian interpretation) as possible bases for keeping territorial integrity, the consolidation and strengthening of the Ottoman Empire. He rejected Ottomanism as a proven failure but did not make a final choice between Pan-Islamism and Turkism as his preferred option. Nonetheless, following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Akçura’s commitment to Turkism and Pan-Turanism grew more pronounced. He played a leading role in the foundation of the nationalist publication Türk Yurdu (Turkish Fatherland) (1911) and of the nationalist society Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearths) (1912) and enjoyed the political favour and patronage of the Unionists, at least after 1912, though unlike Gökalp, he never held a formal position within the CUP’s organisation.

Following the War of Liberation, unlike Gökalp, who, as noted earlier, did not renounce Turanism and Pan-Turkism, Akçura abandoned his earlier arguments on Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism, and limited himself to supporting the new Turkish state, within the territorial boundaries established at Lausanne. This change was manifested in a number of talks given by Akçura in Türk Ocakları, both during and after the War of Liberation. One talk, delivered on 27 April 1923, in the Ankara branch of the Türk Ocakları, was entitled “On the Economic Roots of Turkish Nationalism” (Türk Milliyetçiliğinin İktisadi Menşelerine Dair). In this talk, Akçura (1924: 141-168) made five points: first, he clearly said that the Ottoman Empire, like the Habsburg Empire, was a supra-national one, and belonged to the
medieval age. Second, he said that the ruling class (zümre-i hakime) in the Ottoman Empire had exploited all Ottoman subjects, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Members of the ruling class, he said, had lived a luxurious life by exploiting peasants and war revenues. He added that Armenians, Greeks and Jews had benefited from imports of luxuries, since they had commercial relations with European merchants, and as a result, these non-Muslim merchants, who had controlled foreign, as well as domestic, trade, had generated capital and gained access to the Ottoman ruling circle. He suggested that the Ottoman ruling class and these merchant groups had been in collaboration in exploiting Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Third, Akçura asked why the Ottoman Empire had collapsed, and how. It appears that he was inspired from historical materialism on this issue. In his view, internal and external factors had played a role. Internally, the exploitation of the peasants, in the course of time, became insufficient to meet the luxury consumptions of the ruling class, and in order to meet this deficit, the Ottoman Empire had borrowed loans from European Powers, which in turn had opened the way for European interference in Ottoman finance. In Akçura’s view, internal factors were secondary to external global developments in explaining the collapse of the Ottoman Empire: the latter developments included the discoveries of new trade routes, the industrial revolution and the French revolution. From the seventeenth century onwards, while the military and economic powers of the Ottoman Empire had remained static, the discovery of new trade routes and the industrial revolution had resulted in the economic and military ascendancy of European powers over the Ottoman Empire. The industrial revolution had not only resulted in mass production, at prices lower than those of artisan production, but also had led to the establishment of big companies and trusts, which had their own banking houses to generate necessary capital. The traditional Ottoman means of production could not compete with their European counterparts, and this had resulted in the closure of many workshops and factories in the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations granted to European states had further consolidated European ascendancy over Ottoman industry and trade. Fourth, as a result of industrialization and the huge increase in trade, Akçura said, a new group, the bourgeoisie, had emerged in Europe demanding access to power with the slogan of equality and freedom. This process, he said, had resulted in the replacement of the old aristocracy by the newly emerging bourgeoisie, and the establishment of national states. The ideas of the French revolution had become widespread in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire: non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans had demanded separation from the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim Arab population had then followed suit. One of the reasons for non-Muslim subjects’ demands for separation, Akçura asserted, had been the Ottoman Empire’s failure to protect the interests of its Muslim and non-Muslim merchants against European merchants, who were
advantaged by the *capitulations*. This in turn had encouraged non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire to turn for protection to Russia and the European Powers, further reinforcing their desire for separation from the Ottoman Empire. While the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects had collaborated with the European Powers, the Turks had been left to defend the Ottoman Empire until it had lost the First World War. Fifth, the Turkish War of Liberation, he said, had been the struggle of the Turks for the establishment of a Turkish state. This political objective had been accomplished, and from now on, every Turk must work for the accomplishment of an economically independent Turkish state.

The importance of this talk lay first, in its attempt to offer a socio-economic explanation of the Ottoman Empire’s decline, and second, in its insistence that the new Turkish state must achieve economic as well as political independence. Both these points were echoed, in general terms, in speeches made by members of the Kemalist leadership in 1923 and 1924. However, it would be unwise to draw conclusions about Akçura’s ‘influence’ on Kemalist thinking, still less to present him as the ideological inspiration of Kemalism. Like Gökalp, Akçura occupied a marginal position in public life in the Turkish Republic. In 1923, he was elected an MP, and in 1931, he was appointed as head of the newly established Turkish Historical Association. He also taught at the University of İstanbul until he died in 1935. However, Akçura was not encouraged to formulate an ideology for the RPP.

Yet if the claims made for the specific influence of Gökalp and Akçura may be rejected, it would be idle to deny the existence of a general ideological continuity between the Unionists and Kemalists. The Kemalist leaders were all former Unionists or at least sympathizers, whose political outlook had been largely formed during the Unionist era, and their post-1923 ideology represented, in large part, a development and refinement of Unionist themes. Both the Unionists (particularly from 1912 onwards) and Kemalists were Turkish nationalists. However, while the Unionists’ nationalism had embraced Turanian and Islamic elements, the Kemalists’ nationalism was secular, and tied to the clearly defined objective of building a nation-state on a specific territory. Similarly, Kemalists inherited the goal of the establishment of a national economy from the Unionists. Both the Unionists and Kemalists were against the *capitulations* (Külünk, 2011: 403). But while the Unionists never formulated a clearly defined policy for the accomplishment of the goal, the national economy, the Kemalist administration had a clear strategy that was étatist development strategy.

The Kemalist administration also resembled the Unionists in its authoritarian outlook: the Unionists had concentrated all power in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and Kemalists likewise concentrated power in the RPP leadership. The difference was that while the CUP had never entirely abandoned its original structure as a secret, revolutionary organization, the Kemalist leadership
transformed the “Associations for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia” into an open political party, the RPP.

To conclude this debate, while it is possible to discern a broad ideological continuity between the Unionists and Kemalists, that is nationalism, Kemalists reinterpreted nationalism in the framework of nation-state while the Unionist in a framework of an empire, and the Kemalists’ objectives and means were much more clearly defined. Moreover, while it is possible to discern large zigzags in the understanding of the Unionists’ nationalism from Ottomanism to Islamism and Turanism or Turkism, depending on the territory lost, the Kemalist’s interpretation of nationalism did not much change. The Kemalist’s nationalism was the transformation from the national struggle (War of Liberation) to nation building process, limited to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. Kemalists started off advocating civic nationalism, based on voluntary acceptance, rather than ethnic nationalism.

It may be stated that the broad ideological continuity between Kemalist and the Unionist does not necessarily mean the Kemalist administration implemented the views of the Unionist in its entirety. In the case of Gökalp, as shown above, there are certain departures and in the case of Akçura, it may be suggested, new circumstances, specifically the nation-state framework, absorbed and evolved Akçura into Kemalism, rather than vice versa.

4. Kemalists’ own ideological programme

I argue that Kemalists produced their own ideological programme though they benefitted from other political programmes. Thus, it is appropriate to examine Kemalists’ own ideological programme, as articulated in the RPP congresses. As pointed out by Kili (1969: 60) from its formation in 1923 to its second congress in 1927, the Party had been governed by regulations adopted on 9 September 1923; from 1927 to the third congress in 1931, by the new regulations adopted at the second congress. The second congress formally adopted the principles of Republicanism, Nationalism and Populism; the third congress in 1931 added the principles of Secularism, Revolutionism and Étatism. These six principles became the RPP’s ‘Six Arrows’, which, in 1937, were written into the Turkish Republic’s Constitution (Article 2).

As adopted in 1931, and somewhat expanded in 1935, the below noted principles were written (Webster, 1939: 308-309) also (Tunçay, 1981: 448-449) as follows:

**Republicanism:** The Party is convinced that the Republic is the form of government which represents and realises most safely the ideal of national sovereignty. With this unshakable conviction, the Party defends, with all its means, the Republic against all danger.
**Nationalism:** The Party follows a way parallel to and in harmony with the modern nations in the way of progress and development, and in international contacts and relations. However, the Party considers it essential to preserve the special character and the entirely independent identity of the Turkish social community [As defined in Article 2 of the programme].

**Article 2** of the 1931 RPP programme was written as follows (Tunçay, 1981: 448-449):

It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. [The Turkish community is composed of] A) the small farmers [Çiftçiler], B) small handicraftsmen, C) labourers and workmen, Ç) people exercising free professions, D) industrialists, merchants, and big landowners [büyük arazi sahipleri], big business holders and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish community. The functioning of each of these groups is essential to the life and happiness of the others and of the community. The aims of our Party, with this principle, are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate to the aptitude and to the amount of work.

**Populism:** The source of Will and Sovereignty is the Nation. The Party considers it an important principle that this Will and Sovereignty be used to regulate the proper fulfilment of the mutual duties of the citizen to the State and of the State to the citizen. We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the Law, and who recognise no privileges for any individual, family, class, or community, to be of the people and populist.\(^1\)

**Secularism:** The Party considers it a principle to have the laws, regulations, and methods in the administration of the State prepared and applied in conformity with the needs of the world and on the basis of the fundamentals and methods provided for modern civilisation by science and technique. As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers it to be one of the chief factors of the success of our nation in contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the State.

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\(^1\) At the fourth congress of the RPP in 1935 the above-noted Article 2 was to be added to the paragraph on Populism.
**Revolutionism:** The Party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles which have since been elaborated.

The third congress of the RPP defined étatism as follows:

**Étatisme:** Although considering private activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible.

At the fourth congress of the RPP in 1935, however, the following paragraph was added to étatism (Webster, 1939: 308-309):

The interest of the State in economic matters is to be an actual builder, as well as to encourage private enterprise, and also to regulate and control the work that is being done. The determination of the economic matters to be undertaken by the State depends upon the requirements of the greatest public interests of the nation. If the enterprise, which the State itself decides to undertake actively as a result of this necessity, is in the hands of private entrepreneurs, its appropriation shall, each time, depend upon the enactment of a law, which will indicate the way in which the State shall indemnify the loss sustained by the private enterprise as a result of this appropriation. In estimation of the loss the possibility of future earnings shall not be taken into consideration.

These principles, as formulated in 1927, 1931 and as expanded in 1935 were adopted with no lengthy public discussions; therefore, it is not known whether their formulation provoked any debate or dissent within the RPP or the Kemalist leadership. The meanings of Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Secularism and Revolutionism do not appear to have provoked much discussion. However, the meaning of étatism did provoke much discussion in the RPP, and among intellectuals of the time, in particular between the third and the fourth RPP congresses. Thereafter, discussion died down until after the Second World War (Sarc, 1948).

Despite many scholars argued quite the opposite, the fact is that Kemalists did not deny the existence of classes in Turkey, though they assumed that they could work out a political and economic programme with which they could avoid class conflicts. This is one of the major inconsistencies of Kemalism that they relied on ideologies and political and economic programmes which were within the framework of modern capitalist system that necessarily resulted in class conflicts, however they hoped the result would be a different one. Regarding corporatist option, Kemalists were aware of this debate. However, Kemalist did not have the
means to implement a corporatist model. A corporatist model (either liberal or fascist) necessarily relies on social forces under the control of the state, which tends to reach a compromise between the interests of labour and capital. There did not exist developed organized occupational social forces in Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s. Trade unions were forbidden in 1926 and the insufficient number of Peoples’ Houses, (Halk Evleri) did not reach to every corner of society. It may be noted that Kemalists preferred banning rather than organizing social forces under their control. For recent studies see Plaggenborg, 2014 and Ülker, 2023.

5. Political structure of the Kemalist administration

It is now appropriate to examine the political structure of the Kemalist administration. The two conflicting arguments on the political structure of the Kemalist administration are centered on the question of whether the Kemalist administration may be characterized as a democratic one or a dictatorship. The advocates of the first argue that the Kemalist administration, if nothing else, at least prepared a ground for the establishment of democracy in Turkey. Contrary to this, the second put forward that the Kemalist administration was a dictatorship, hindering the establishment of democracy in Turkey. When they are examined closely, the two conflicting assertions tend to employ the same evidence to support correctness of their assertions. To give an example; the Grand National Assembly is treated as evidence to support that the political structure was democracy because the MPs were elected, and the decisions were taken through parliament or at least sanctioned by the MPs. The advocates of the counter argument argue that decisions were pre-decided and taken before coming into the parliament, therefore, the parliament was no more than a tool of legitimization of the administration. Such a discussion does not make much headway; because the advocates of both views tend to judge the Kemalist administration according to their idealized form of dictatorship and democracy. This is one of the problems which is hindering sensible discussions on the subject in question. Second and equally important is the fact that both assertions fail to ask whether the establishment of democracy was priority for Kemalists or not. The answer to this question is so clear that the establishment of democracy was not priority for Kemalists. It was not democracy, but other priorities, such as industrialisation and secular reforms, dominated the agenda of Kemalists. Besides, Kemalists read more of Rousseau and other philosophers of enlightenment whom none discussed democracy lengthily; Rousseau advocated the need for a contract between the state and society while Montesquieu underlined the significance of separation of powers. The emphasis was upon enlightenment. There is no need to forcibly identify the Kemalist administration with democratic society or dictatorship; by no means the Kemalist administration fits into democratic
society in the strict sense, nor does it fit into dictatorship as decisions were taken in the Grand National Assembly and general elections were regularly held.

As to democracy, there is no idealized form of democracy. In the capitalist system, there is an ongoing oscillation between liberal democracy at one end of the political spectrum and fascism at the other. Kemalism falls somewhere between these two extremes. It is impossible to say that it was democratic as in Turkey at the time there were no developed social forces with their own power bases to demand and materialize their objectives through democratic means. A democratic society can be observed when social forces can raise their demands relying on their own power bases and struggle and negotiate each other under equal condition in a just political space. It is not possible to say that there were such developed social forces in Turkey, nor could it be assumed that such a political space existed. It is therefore impossible to say that the Kemalist administration was democratic, though it fitted into one of many different representative democracies. To be more specific, such a discussion—whether or not—does not make much headway. This brings us to examine political structure of the Kemalist administration.

In theory and practice, the new Turkish Republic was a constitutional representative parliamentary democracy, in which authority was vested in a popularly elected unicameral parliament, the Grand National Assembly. In reality, it was authoritarian, with power concentrated in the hands of a small leadership group who headed the RPP, as the “Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia” had been renamed on 9 September 1923. It is clear that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who combined the twin posts of president of the Republic and the leader of the RPP, was the commanding figure, determining and approving all major policies, and appointing and dismissing ministers and other senior officials. His closest associates included İsmet İnönü, Fethi Okyar and Celal Bayar (three Prime Ministers); Saffet Arıkan and Recep Peker (the successive General Secretaries of the RPP); Ali Çetinkaya (head of the Tribunal of Independence (İstiklal Mahkemesi); Fevzi Çakmak (the Chief of the General Staff); Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (Minister of Justice); Mustafa Şeref Özkan (Minister of the Economy and in 1932 Celal Bayar); Tevfik Rüştü Aras (Minister of Foreign Affairs); Şakir Kesebir, Şükrü Kaya, (high ranking bureaucrats) and Mahmut Soydan, Fahlı Rıfkı Atay and Yunus Nadi Abalıoğlu (leading journalists).

When on 29 October 1923 the Republic was declared, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was elected President of Turkey, Fethi Okyar chairman of the Grand National Assembly, and İsmet İnönü Prime Minister. From 1923 to 1938, Atatürk was the President and leader of the RPP, İnönü, acting leader of the RPP, held the Prime Ministership except for a short period from 1924 to 1925, during which Fethi Okyar became Prime Minister, and from 1937 to 1938, during which Celal Bayar became Prime Minister. Recep Peker, Saffet Arıkan and Ali Çetinkaya were organizers of
the RPP and active in deciding nominees for membership to parliament. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, who had studied law in İstanbul and had completed a doctoral study in law in Switzerland, specialising in constitutional law, held the Ministry of the Economy in 1923 and the Ministry of Justice from 1924 to 1930, and was in 1926 the most influential figure in the introduction of civil and criminal laws based on Western models, and had played important roles in holding the 1923 National Economic Congress in İzmir. Mustafa Şeref Özkan, who had studied law in İstanbul and Paris and had served as under-secretary to the Minister of Agriculture during the last years of the Unionist rule and had served as the chief advisor to İnönü at the Lausanne Conference, served as the Minister of the Economy from 1930 to 1932 and was then a member of the Economic Committee of the parliament. Celal Bayar, who had been a cashier in the Bursa branch of the Deutsche Orient Bank, held the Ministry of Reconstruction for the Settlement of Exchanged Populations in the first half of 1924 and served as the Director General of the İş Bank from July 1924 to September 1932, and became the Minister of the Economy from 1932 to 1937. Şakir Kesebir held several ministerialships for short periods and served as a member of the Economic Committee of the Parliament and member to the Supreme Economic Council (Ali İktisat Meclisi), an advisory council to the Ministry of the Economy, whose members included businessmen and MPs. Şükrü Kaya, who had been an official during the Unionist period, was the Ministry of Agriculture in 1924 and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1925 for short periods and served as a member of both the Economic and Foreign Affairs Committees in Parliament. Mahmut Soydan edited the daily Milliyet, and became the chairman of the board of the İş Bank after Celal Bayar became the Minister of the Economy in September 1932. Falih Rıfkı Atay edited the semi-official daily Hakimiyet-i Milliye, and served as a member of the Alphabet Reform Committee. Yunus Nadi Abalıoğlu edited the daily Cumhuriyet. Fevzi Çakmak served as the Chief of General Staff from 1923 to 1938, and from 1918 to 1919 had been the Chief of General Staff of the Ottoman Army. They were all MPs and held several ministerships at different times. (Aydemir, 1963, 1965a, 1965b, 1966, 1968; Zürcher, 1984).

To a significant degree, all these men had a common background. They were almost without exception former Ottoman military officers and civil servants, and most of them were graduates of the military schools, notably the General Staff College (Erkan-i Harbiye Mektebi), and of the civil administrative colleges. They were mainly sons of civil servants, they were former adherents of the CUP or at least sympathizers, which had dominated Ottoman political life between 1908 and 1918, and they had played active parts in the War of Liberation. They may be defined as military-civil bureaucrats.

These men owed their collective rise to power in part to their prominence in the War of Liberation, and in part because of the processes, in particular the power
struggle within the leadership of the War of Liberation, which led to the elimination of their rivals. As early as 1921, a dissenting faction, the so-called ‘second group’, had emerged in the Ankara parliament, and in November 1924 the Kemalist leadership was faced by a serious split when a few prominent figures resigned from the ruling party, the RPP to form the Progressive Republican Party (PRP). Among the founders of this opposition party were a few senior military officers who had played major roles in the War of Liberation: Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay and some 32 others (Zürcher, 1984: 68-105; Tunçay, 1981: 127-146; Arıkoğlu, 1961; Uran, 1959; Tunaya 1982; Atay, 1980; Goloğlu, 1974). The differences which led to the creation of the PRP appears to have had little to do with ideology or social background: in both these respects, the PRP’s leaders closely resembled their former colleagues in the RPP. Both were nationalists. Rather, the dissent appears to have been provoked by personal ambitions and partially by fears that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and some of his closest associates were concentrating too much power in their own hands. In any case, the PRP did not survive long. The outbreak of the Şeyh Sait rebellion in south-eastern Anatolia in February 1925 led to introduction of an emergency legislation, under the terms of which the PRP was dissolved in June 1925 as the court established a linkage between a member of PRP who had been involved in the rebellion. In the following year, 1926, the discovery of a planned attempt upon Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s life, and an alleged plot against the republican administration prepared by senior military officers, afforded the Kemalist administration a pretext to organize a series of trials, which resulted in discrediting the former PRP leaders and also eliminating the surviving remnants of the old CUP leadership. Most of potential rivals for power had been eliminated, and the RPP leadership henceforth ran Turkey as a one-party rule (Tunçay, 1981: 127-146).

In August 1930, however, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk instructed Fethi Okyar, a close associate and former Prime Minister then serving as Ambassador to France, to set up an opposition party, the Free Republican Party (FRP). Atatürk signaled that in his capacity as President of the Republic, he would remain neutral between the FRP and the RPP, a few serving RPP MPs volunteered or were instructed to join the new party, and the FRP was permitted to contest impending municipal elections (Okyar, 1980). There is much about this episode which remains obscure, and not least, the question of Atatürk’s motives for sponsoring an opposition. Turkey was already beginning to feel the effects of the World Depression, and he may have calculated that popular discontent required a safety-valve. Be that as it may, it soon became clear that the President had unleashed forces which threatened to escape from his control. An FRP demonstration at İzmir in September 1930 provoked an anti-RPP riot, and the government’s unpopularity was further confirmed by the FRP’s success in the municipal elections in October. Atatürk
responded by indicating that he must have abandoned his neutrality, and side with the RPP, whose leader he remained. Okyar took the hint, and the FRP dissolved itself on 16 November 1930 (Us, 1964; Okyar, 1980). Turkey was once more a one-party administration.

Nonetheless, the FRP episode deserves closer examination since it was to be followed by important changes within the RPP. The FRP, it should be noted, was a creation of the liberals of the time, sanctioned by Atatürk, who reviewed and revised the new party’s programme (Okyar, 1980: 476; Ağaoğlu, 1969). To this extent, it may be suggested, the FRP episode was evidence of dissension within the Kemalist leadership. Although the FRP was careful to show its loyalty to the existing republican principles, and in particular, to the policies of secularization, it did seek to distance itself from the RPP in questions of economic policy. This suggests that the difference between the RPP and FRP was not of ideological, but of economic policy positions.

The FRP identified itself with ‘economic liberalism’, promising that if it came to power, it would pursue a ‘liberal’ economic policy (Ağaoğlu, 1969; Okyar, 1980). However, the precise content of this commitment remains unclear. For one thing, the FRP survived for no more than three and a half months, scarcely long enough to develop a clear economic programme. For another, as stated in the article 7 of the party program (Ağaoğlu, 1969: 159-160), the FRP promised to enlarge the scope of the privileges granted to private enterprise by the 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry, a measure which was protectionist, rather than liberal in a strict sense. Other disputes between the FRP and the RPP over economic issues offer no clearer indicators to the new party’s underlying economic goals. Okyar and İnönü disagreed over the method of repaying the Ottoman Public Debt, and the FRP attacked the government’s railway construction programme as being over-ambitious. Nonetheless, as an examination of the views of the FRP’s chief economic specialist, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, suggests that the FRP’s ‘liberalism’ did reinforce a belief that the government should give greater scope and assistance to private enterprise. In a direct response to this, in August 1930, İnönü announced that the RPP would pursue a policy of ‘moderate étatism’, thereby introducing this term into public discussion for the first time. All these suggest that within the Kemalist administration there was a trend of dissension in respect to economic policies, rather than an ideological difference.

To conclude the argument on the Kemalist administration’s political outlook, it may be stated that in terms of its political structure the Kemalist administration may be described as an authoritarian, one-party rule, dominated by a small group of leaders who shared a common socio-economic background and common experiences, including the crucial experience of the War of Liberation. At the same
time, there are indications of differing views within the leadership, particularly over economic policy, as evidenced by the Free Republican Party episode.

6. The Kemalist administration’s socio-economic characterization

How the Kemalist administration may be characterized in socio-economic terms is a fair question. One school of thought defines Kemalists as ‘petit-bourgeois’ (Timur, 1971; Yerasimos, 1989). This definition makes sense as far as the social origins of the Kemalist leaders are concerned: they were predominantly the offspring of military officers and civil servants of ‘the middling sort’, and they had received their education in the state-financed Ottoman military and civil colleges. No one of them came from rich landowning or commercial backgrounds; none were the offspring of peasants or workers. But beyond this, it may be suggested, the characterization of Kemalists as ‘petit-bourgeois’ does not tell us much. Characteristics of “petit-bourgeois” rule are that it regards itself as representative of small property-owners and is hostile to the interests of the wealthy bourgeois, merchant capitalist and feudal landowner. In the case of the Kemalist leadership, there are no apparent grounds for believing that Kemalists regarded themselves as the representative and protector specifically of small property-owners: of shopkeepers, independent artisans, or peasants who owned the land they worked. Nor are there any grounds for regarding the Kemalist leadership as hostile to the interests of the wealthy, whether ‘feudal’ landowners or ‘bourgeois’ capitalists. Therefore, it may be suggested that although Kemalists may be characterized as ‘petit-bourgeois’ in their social background, they cannot be regarded as representatives and defenders of petit-bourgeois interests.

Another school of thought argues that the military-civil bureaucrats did not rule alone; rather, the essence of Kemalist administration was an ‘alliance’ between the military-civil bureaucrats, who controlled the state apparatus, and the landowners, who controlled the countryside (Özbudun, 1989; Avcıoğlu, 1987: 354-362; Yerasimos, 1989: 104). It is possible to identify a land-owning class in Turkey during the period in question generally known as the eşraf, these men enjoyed considerable social prestige and influence in the countryside, through their ownership of land worked for them by peasant share-croppers or labourers. Many such landowners had given support to the War of Liberation, and not a few served thereafter as RPP MPs. But caution is needed before drawing conclusions about any ‘alliance’.

It is by no means clear that, after the War of Liberation, the eşraf sought to act as a coherent pressure-group within the Kemalist administration, or even within the RPP. Undoubtedly landowners maintained their local authority and influence during the period in question, but there seems to be no substantial reason to regard
them as an active, core element of the administration, exercising a decisive influence upon policy. The assumption that they may have done so, it appears, derives from the absence of any proposal for land reform in the administration’s otherwise radical programme of economic and cultural changes: indeed, not until 1945 was the RPP to bring forward a tentative and limited scheme of land reform (Doğanay, 1977: 365-369). But it is by no means obvious that this failure to pursue land reform was the product of landowners’ pressure. It is true that the RPP’s leadership declared that ‘the peasant is the master of the nation’, but such rhetorical decoration aside, there is no evidence that the possibility of a land reform was ever seriously considered in the years between 1923 and 1938. İnönü acknowledged it retrospectively in 1967 that “We did not touch the land reform issue during the lifetime of Atatürk” (Milliyet, 20.11.1967). The absence of a serious land reform proposal, it may be suggested, was related in part to the abundance of land in Turkey during the period in question, and the fact that the state itself had lands to distribute to landless peasants, and periodically did so, though on a limited scale (Aydemir, 1966: 333-335; Hershlag, 1968: 78-79). It is also possible that the Kemalist leadership saw economic disadvantages in a land reform: a fragmentation of holdings might lead to a decrease in agricultural production. This, however, is speculation: there is no hard evidence available to support the suggestion. In addition, it is worth stressing that the RPP was ideologically not an egalitarian populist party, and nor, to judge by its party programme, was it particularly preoccupied by agricultural matters. During the period in question agricultural education was not of primary importance in comparison with technical schools (Aykut, 1947: 37-62). The People’s Houses (Halk Evleri), established from 1932 onwards to propagate social reforms, were located in the towns rather than in rural areas. In the final analysis, in the eyes of the RPP leadership, agricultural matters were of secondary importance in comparison with industrialization. Its one major practical gesture to peasants and landowners was the abolition of the tithe (Aşar, rural tax on production, equivalent to 12.5 per cent of production) in 1925. This reform, which had been promised during the War of Liberation and at the İzmir Economic Congress of 1923, benefited peasants and landowners alike. It scarcely indicates as evidence of a military-civil bureaucratic-landowning alliance.

Therefore, it would be misleading to assume that there was an ‘alliance’ between the military-civil bureaucrats and the landowning class after the War of Liberation. Yet a third school of thought in this category (Berberoğlu, 1982; Kongar, 1977) defines the social and economic policies of the Kemalist administration as ‘state capitalist’. This school characterizes the single-party rule as ‘petit-bourgeois’ in background and origin; but implies that the Kemalist administration was nonetheless hi-jacked by the so-called ‘İş Bank group’, a network of officials, businessmen and industrialists who enjoyed close personal connections with the
administration, and who benefited from various economic privileges granted by the governments in the 1920s. On this view, the influence of the İş Bank group grew during the 1930s, particularly following Celal Bayar’s appointment as Minister of the Economy in September 1932, and the same group played a significant role in shaping the government’s étatist policies from that date onwards.

This school of thought clearly explains how the İş Bank group grew in time and exerted its influence on the formation of Kemalist administration’s economic policies, and therefore it is worth examining the processes which determined characteristics of the relationship between the İş Bank group and the state. As early as 1930 a differing view had appeared within the Kemalist leadership over the meaning of étatism, and from 1932 onwards such a differing view became more visible between two factions conventionally known as the İş Bank and İnönü groups. The two groups agreed on the two broad principles that private enterprises should continue to be a fundamental part of Turkey's economy, and that the state should take an active part in industrial investment. However, the two groups gave differing emphases to each of these principles. The İnönü group argued that in order to lead the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible, the state should take an active part in its economic life and the government should have extensive rights to regulate private enterprises. The July laws of 1932 were the expression of this line of thought (Boratav, 1982; Kuruç, 2011; Şahinkaya, 2019). As a first step, a series of laws were enacted in July 1932 to allow for greater intervention in the economy. Among these, laws no. 2054, 2056, 2058 and 2064 deserve particular mention. Law no. 2054, dated 3 July 1932, empowered the government to unite and administer the import and export monopolies, such as those on tea, sugar and coffee, which had been set up in the 1920s. The reason for this move was to keep foreign trade balanced. Some of the countries which exported tea, coffee and sugar to Turkey had surpluses in their balance of trade with Turkey. The new law would enable the government to press for barter agreements with those countries. The law did not prevent private traders from importing tea, sugar and coffee, but stipulated that they should provide the same value of exports in return for imports. By law no. 2056, dated 3 July 1932, the Agricultural Bank was authorized to buy and sell wheat, enabling the government to regulate the prices of wheat and take measures against their seasonal fluctuation. Law no 2058, dated 3 July 1932, established the ‘State Office for Industry’, and law no. 2064, dated 7 July 1932, provided for the setting up of an ‘Industrial Credit Bank.’ The State Office for Industry and the Industrial Credit Bank together took over the industrial functions of the Bank for Industry and Mining, which had played an important role in the management of state enterprises, and had also participated in private enterprises. The State Office for Industry took over factories from the Bank for Industry and Mining, and was authorized to plan industry, and to supervise all existing factories, both state-owned
and private. The Industrial Credit Bank was to finance state enterprises. In June 1933, in a further reorganization, the Sümerbank was founded in the Industrial Credit Bank’s place. The Sümerbank took over a number of factories from the State Office for Industry and became the principal representative of state enterprise in industry. In the course of time, the government allotted additional funds from the state budget to increase the capital and activities of the Sümerbank, which directly owned dozens of factories, workshops and power plants, and participated to a considerable degree in some private enterprises. The Sümerbank's profits enabled it to finance new investments. A second major state-owned bank, Eti bank, was set up in 1935. Its tasks were to purchase and sell minerals, to search for oil, to develop electric power plants and to perform all kinds of banking transactions (Boratav, 1982, 181-214; Özelmas, 1963). In practice, the state, beside operating railways, ships, farms, mines and factories, acted as a wholesale and retail trader of the products of state enterprises. The İş Bank group, on the other hand, argued that there should be a limit to the state’s role in the economy. They criticized the state for neglecting private enterprise, and the étatist hierarchy for being inefficient and bureaucratic. The İş Bank group’s interpretation of étatism was somewhat negative: “étatism begins where private enterprise stops.” (Sarc, 1948: 432; Hale, 1980:100-117). Evidently, the İş Bank group’s argument did not have much to do with economic liberalism, since it was in favor of the heavy protection of local manufacturing, and strongly supported the 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry, which had granted extensive privileges to the private sector. It is significant that aside from the tax exemptions and privileges granted to private enterprise by the 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry, banking appears to have been the main source of capital for the private sector (Tezel, 1986 :113). In the 1930s the İş Bank played a major role in the construction of railway system, the lumber industry, coal production, the sugar, textile and glass industries, and insurance companies. In the sugar industry, the İş Bank acted as the representative of the private sector, together with the state banks. The İş Bank also co-operated with the Sümerbank in developing the Keçiborlu sulphur mines. Besides supplying credit for trade and industry, the İş Bank played an important role in imports and exports. The extent of the political influence of the İş Bank group became clear in September 1932. Earlier that year, as noted, the ‘July Laws’ had been introduced, preparing a foundation for étatist policies, and also reducing the privileges previously enjoyed by private enterprise (Boratav, 1982: 181-214; Hershlag, 1968: 90-91; Tezel, 1986: 199). The outstanding feature of the ‘July Laws’ was that the activities and authorities of the Bank for Industry and Mining, which had been set up in 1925, were divided in two: the State Office for Industry was granted responsibility for the organization and planning of state and private industry, and the Industrial Credit Bank, for financing state industry. This caused considerable
resentment among the İş Bank group, since, according to the new law, the State Office for Industry was to have almost absolute control over the direction of state enterprises, and was given extensive rights in deciding whether private companies should enter any field of industrial activity. The State Office for Industry was also given the right to supervise existing private enterprises. Finally, this law granted the State Office for Industry the right to decide forms of partnership between state and private enterprise, and the State Office for Industry furthermore had the right to transfer profitable private enterprises to state ownership (Tekeli and İlkin, 1982:145-158).

In sum, the established partnership between the private sector and state enterprises was in danger. In the same month as the ‘July Laws’, the İş Bank group put forward a project to establish a paper factory and asked the Ministry of Economy for credit. Mustafa Şeref Özkan, the Minister of Economy, refused, after consultation with İnönü, the Prime Minister, on the grounds that a paper industry should remain within the framework of state entrepreneurship. All these discussions were referred to the President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who confirmed that the İş Bank group should not be granted the right to set up a paper factory, but also dismissed the Minister of Economy, Mustafa Şeref Özkan, replacing him with Celal Bayar on 9 September 1932. In Turkish historiography, this is called the ‘Yalova operation’ (Boratav, 1982: 121-132; Goloğlu, 1974: 41-50). Until this appointment, Celal Bayar had served as General Director of the İş Bank. The İş Bank group quickly found Celal Bayar's ministerial attitude sympathetic. He favoured amendment of the ‘July Laws’, and in June 1933 the State Office for Industry and the Industrial Credit Bank were abolished, and replaced by the Sümerbank, freeing the private sector to establish once more partnerships with state enterprises (Boratav, 1982: 121-132). In 1937 Celal Bayar was appointed Prime Minister, replacing İsmet İnönü, seemingly, a further victory for the İş Bank group and its views on étatism, though one which did not prove lasting: following Atatürk’s death in November 1938, İnönü became President, and Celal Bayar was soon removed from the premiership.

7. Conclusion

The Kemalist administration may well be characterized as a coalition of forces of military and civil bureaucrats who shared a common socio-economic background and whose aim was to transform Turkey from backwardness to contemporary modernization. The preliminary assumptions of the Kemalist leadership were the duty of military-civil bureaucrat-intellectuals to work for the transformation of society. Therefore, the modernization of Turkey on a Western model, they assumed, should be undertaken by the military-civil bureaucrats who had legitimized
themselves through their successful conduct of the War of Liberation as well as transforming it from national struggle into a nation and state building process.

There is no need to exaggerate the putative influence of the Unionist predecessor. Kemalists borrowed nationalism from the Unionists, however, they refined the themes. Moreover, the Kemalist leadership produced their own ideological programme, articulated by the Six Arrows. While doing the nation and state building, the Kemalist leadership were deliberately preoccupied with urban development, in particular industrialization, and the rural matters remained secondary in their development strategy, as industrialization was possible in a short period compared to rural development that might have taken longer time and much expensive as it required expensive investments such as irrigation system and a large rail and road networks to connect producers and the markets.

The dissension within Kemalist administration did not result from ideological differences as all were nationalists but was a process and product of the development strategy put into practice. The interactions between some of the bureaucrats and interest groups, who were interwoven through bureaucratic mechanisms as well as resulting from the assumption that a national bourgeoisie be brought up, widened the gap between those who assigned themselves a duty of protecting the administration from the influence of interest groups and those who believed that creation of national bourgeoisie must be achieved through the state encouragement. In the course of time, the interest groups successfully exerted their influence on the formation and implementation of the development strategy. These were the processes, not a pre-decided policies or plans. Nevertheless, the processes prepared the ground and paved the way for the establishment of capitalist modernization in Turkey, regardless of not being their intentions at least in their rhetoric.

Assigning the state an autonomous position in society, as if it were free from the influences of different segments of society, was the basic misconception of the Kemalist military-civilian bureaucrats. The case of the Kemalist administration shows that even if the state organs were dominated by dedicated bureaucrat-intellectuals, the state could not create a sustainable autonomous position in society.

All in all, we can conclude that Kemalism was a national response that aimed to place Turkey within the modern state system. The success of Kemalists in achieving this goal should not be underestimated.
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Özet

Kemalizm yeniden okumak


Anahtar kelimeler: Kemalizm, ideoloji, altı ok, Gökalp, Akçura, çifte devrim, Türkiye’de kalkınma stratejisi.