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Competing discourses of nationalisms and anti-Americanisms in Turkey:

Iraq war as a case study

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Abstract

Since the events of 9/11 in the USA, academic studies have questioned how the Islamic world perceives and imagines Americans and American foreign policy. In this context, Turkey comes into prominence among Muslim countries, with 90 percent of its population self-identifying as anti-American. This study argues that there are different versions of anti-Americanism in Turkey based on the power struggle of different discourses of Turkish nationalism. For a deeper understanding of why these anti-Americanisms exist, where they come from and how they relate to and challenge each other, it analyzes Turkish media representations of the USA’s war in Iraq by using a discourse-historical approach of Vienna School.

*Key words:*Anti-Americanism, Turkish nationalism, Iraq War, Turkish media, discourse analysis.

1. Introduction

The literature on *Anti-Americanism* shows that there are varieties of Anti-Americanisms from different parts of the world (Friedman 2012). Robert Keohane and Peter Katzenstein (2007) made series of observations on the disaggregation of anti-Americanism and pointed out a typology of anti-Americanisms: liberal anti-Americanism; radical anti-Americanism; sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism; cultural elitist anti-Americanism; legacy anti-Americanism. This study considers these multiple versions of anti-Americanism and offers to focus on Turkey which provides a fruitful case study for a research on different strains of anti-Americanism, with 90 percent of the population self-identifying as anti-American (Blaydes and Linzer 2012: 4). By making use of Katzenstein and Keohane’s theoretical classification Turkmen (2010) defined Turkish attitude as “sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism” which sees any kind of American intervention as an attack on its national independence and sovereignty. According to Taspinar (2005), anti-Americanism stems from Turkey’s Kemalist identity problem. Kemalism, as a secularist-nationalist political project distrusts Washington regarding perceived enemies of the Turkish republic: Kurdish nationalism and political Islam. In the same vein, Criss (2002) argued that anti-Americanism rooted from Turkish efforts to preserve sovereignty as well as from the ideological commitments of the Turkish Left, especially in the 1960s. When U.S. actions challenged Turkey’s sovereignty during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the Cyprus crisis of 1963/1964, anti-American protests reached a level of intensity. Unlu-Bilgic (2015) pointed out that the roots of anti-Americanism dated back to even before the 1960s, to 1945, the birth period of alliance after the World War II. Despite being a long-time NATO ally, anti-Americanism has been strong in Turkish political discourse (Guney 2008).

In a nutshell, anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in Turkey; however, the decision of the U.S. to go to war in Iraq after the 9/11 terror attacks on New York and Washington intensified attitudes toward the USA (Lindberg and Nossel 2006). Anti-Americanism has remarkably seen a marked rise in Turkish public opinion since the USA launched military operations in Iraq in 2003. After six months of negotiations between Ankara and Washington, Turkish parliament made the unexpected decision of denying U.S. troops’ access to Iraq via south-eastern Turkey in March 2003. Turkey’s decision forced Washington to shift its original war plans and complicated the post-war situation (Taspinar 2005).

Therefore, this study focuses on the Iraq War period in order to analyze different discourses of anti-Americanism in Turkish media. In this context, this study has two main arguments. First, it argues that there are different discourses of Turkish nationalism which produce different discourses of anti-Americanism in Turkey. That is to say, there are at least two more versions of Turkish anti-Americanism besides the Kemalist sovereign-nationalist one: Islamist anti-Americanism; and liberal anti-Americanism. Second, analyzing different media perspectives on the war in Iraq demonstrates an ongoing clash of contested narratives of the Turkish nation for domination and observes varieties of Turkish anti-Americanism. In this manner, this research originally contributes to the debate of Turkish anti-Americanism with a further understanding of why and where these different perceptions exist and come from, and how they relate and challenge with each other.

1. Theoretical and methodological background of the study

David Campbell (1998, pp.48-50) noted that nation-state identity is secured through discourse of danger, that requires definition of difference and 'otherness' for securing the 'self' and its world. The state and 'man' grounds and justifies its policies and actions by offering who and what 'we' are, who and what 'foreigners' are, and what 'we' have to fear. Therefore, national security and foreign policy texts locate and define national identity and values and nation's place in the world. As Campbell illustrated (ibid p.30) how US foreign policy against the Soviet threat in the 60s reinforced American identity and reproduced the religious character of the nation. This study analyzes the interconnectivity between Turkish nationalism and anti-Americanism during the Iraq War. In this case, it employs Nationalism and Media Studies through a comparative discourse analysis in the Turkish press to reveal how the Turks define themselves and others (the USA) and view their place in the world. In this context, the leading role of Turkish media is considered in interpreting, constructing and representing different ideologies of nationalism (Kadioglu and Keyman 2011) across the country.

Various definitions of ‘nation’ and explanations of the rise of nationalism have been offered in the literature (Hutchinson and Smith 1995; Ozkirimli 2000); however this research sees nationalism as an ideology, as patterns of belief, practice, assumption, habit and representation that are reproduced in daily discourse. Discourse governs how to think and write about the nation (Waever 2001, p. 29) under the influence of power relations and interest order. In this context, the discursive constructive vision of nation as an imagined community (Anderson 1983) is useful in identifying strategies used in the definition of self and other relations.

Nationalism resides in discourse and is shaped by discourse. In this context, Ruth Wodak’s Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) in Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak at all 1999) is suitable for research that explores nationalist discourses in their own historical and linguistic production contexts. The media's role in identity construction demonstrates the daily construction of nationalism and its discourse-historical production (Wodak et al. 1999). In particular, analyzing newspaper discourses is useful for understanding ideological relations in society and how the relations and structures of power are embedded in everyday language. This approach leads to a comparison of different discourses on one and the same topic and how they interconnect and challenge with each other. This perspective defines the discursive strategies of national identities as constructive, destructive, perpetuatory or transformatory (ibid. p. 33-42) which allow understanding the changing and competing meanings of the identities through the discursive change. For the search of the linguistic means and realizations of the discursive strategies used in reconstruction of Turkey’s identity, the analysis focuses on “self/other relationships” through linguistic construction of common political past, common present and future.

As one of the key concepts of DHA, *intertextuality* (Wodak and Meyer 2001; Weiss and Wodak 2003) serves the observation of continuities and discontinuities in the discursive construction of national identity. In this regard, coverage of the events in the media discourse contributes continuous transmission of meaning over time. Therefore, analyzing the media coverage is chosen for this research to demonstrate the hybrid character of Turkish anti-Americanism. This will be undertaken by revealing the competing discourses that actively construct Turkey's different identities through representations of Iraq War in Turkish print media.

In fact, in the history of media and politics in Turkey, the subject of political pressure on the media has usually been the armed forces, the elected government and the judiciary (Kaya and Cakmur 2010). In order to protect economic interests in other sectors such as education, construction and telecommunication, the big businesses in the television sector dramatically drive self-censorship and fail to develop a presence independent from the state (Sozeri and Guney 2011; Christensen 2007). Therefore, the big media patrons lack the ability and will to function properly as the *fourth estate* that challenge the state’s interests and policies. In the chosen period, the media industry was divided into the biggest six of the media groups in Turkey: *Dogan, Calik, Cukurova, Dogus, Fox and Ciner.* However,Turkey has witnessed new ownership and control relations in the media economy-politics of the last decade (Aydin 2015).

Nevertheless, Turkish newspapers were very helpful in identifying various discourses based on different ideologies and in understanding the struggle of power and strategies of logics of equivalence and difference within identity constructions. Even newspapers presented certain difficulties, and there were certain features of journalism in Turkey that must be taken into account. One encouraging characteristic that makes this study feasible is that Turkish newspapers have very courageous columnists, as Noam Chomsky expressed in an interview in January 2012*.*

Therefore, four daily newspapers have been chosen for surveying and comparing different discourses of Turkish nationalism in Turkish press. These are the *secularist Cumhuriyet,* Muslim conservative *Zaman,* right-wing *Hurriyet,* and left-wing *Radikal*. In this context, the representatives of Turkish nationalism in the Turkish media (from 2001 to 2011) are categorized in three main discourses (Kadioglu and Keyman 2011): Secularist Kemalist Discourse (*Cumhuriyet*); Islamist Discourse (*Zaman*); Liberal (including left) Discourse (*Hurriyet* and *Radikal*).

To what extent and in what forms Turkish nationhood is reconstructed daily by the press can be analyzed on randomly selected days (Yumul and Ozkirimli 2000). In the case of the Iraq War, the sampling articles begin with the events of 11 September 2001 and 1 March 2003, the date of Turkey's decision regarding the Iraq War. The time period of the discourse analysis ends in 2011 when the political uprisings of the Arab world broke out and new challenges occurred for Turkish foreign policy (Oguzlu 2016, p.59).

In order to analyze Turkish national identity and anti-Americanism discourse in these newspapers, the research must follow three stages: (1) the main themes of a specific discourse must first be established; (2) the discursive strategies must be investigated; and (3) the linguistic means and realizations of the discursive strategies must be examined (Wodak et all 1999). Therefore, first, three themes of Turkish identity are laid out in the selected case study: being Secular, being Muslim and being Western. This is followed by an investigation of the discursive strategies used to develop Turkish nationalism as an ideology and different discursive construction of anti-Americanism. Finally, it examines the linguistic means and realizations of discursive strategies to observe how particular themes can be argued to contribute the re-construction of Turkish anti-Americanism.

Using both manual and digital searches for key words reveals how elaborately and associatively Muslim, Secular, Non-Muslim, Western identity themes are presented in the media coverage of Iraq War. To tackle the large body of these articles, these selected themes qualify and limit the *sampling frame* (Bertrand and Hughes 2004, p.67). In a nutshell, the selection procedures are developed parallel to the main research question that seeks to highlight the self-other relations and diversity of Turkish anti-Americanism discourses.

1. The representation of the Iraq war in Turkish media

At the broader international level, the debates of Islam versus the West after 9/11 events and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 influenced the importance of Turkey’s Muslim and secular identities. In the post-9/11 process, Turkey's pro-Islamist AKP government internationally became more of an issue in terms of its role in Iraq intervention, transformation of radical Islam, the West-Islam world relations and in particular the USA’s relationship with Islam. In relation to the USA’s occupation in the region, Colin Powell’s moderate Islamic formulation (Oktem 2013, p.82) triggered a debate using Turkey as a model for moderate Muslim democracy. However, the decision of America’s loyal Muslim ally Turkey not to allow US troops through Turkish territory during the invasion of Iraq was unexpected and interpreted as the turning point in reorientation of Turkish Foreign Policy (Oran 2013: 269-276). The problematic relations with the USA contributed to a major increase in anti-American and anti-West sentiments in Turkey (Uslu et all 2005). A nationalist reaction with an anti-USA attitude settled into Turkish public discourse due to the growing instability and the human costs of the Iraq War.

Regarding these points, this section traces the themes of Turkey’s Muslim identity, Secular and Western identity in the representation of the Iraq War in the Turkish media. The discourse analysis of the media texts also provides clues to the deeper understanding of Turkey’s “No” decision to the war against Iraq on 1 March 2003 in terms of rising anti-Americanism.

1. The security-based discourse of Kemalist sovereign- nationalist anti-Americanism

In this part, Turkish media’s coverage of Iraq War indicates ongoing clashes of contested versions of Turkish nationalism and anti-Americanism as their common attitude. On the morning of 1 March 2003, the day of decision-making on the Iraq War in the Turkish National Grand Assembly (TNGA), the concept of American invasion was used in the pro-secularist discourse against the government’s will of allying with the USA. In secularist *Cumhuriyet* (01.03.2003, p.3), it was argued that once the TNGA permitted foreign soldiers, the USA would have the chance to settle its soldiers in the most strategic areas of the Turkish land.

The next example strengthens ‘the otherness’ of America in the Turkey's national imagination. Within a *security-based* discourse, America is constructed as not only threatening Turkey in general terms, but also as a danger for Kemalist nation-state identity. Apparently, Kemalists tend to refer to the foundation times of the Turkish Republic to define the concepts of ‘we’ and ‘them’. The next quotation from Ilhan Selcuk’s article reminds this Republican narrative and affirms that the historical struggle is still alive in Turkey, which might be seen in the case of the Iraq War (*Cumhuriyet*, 01.03.2003 p.2):

*“Kemalism is the Anatolian style of ‘Enlightenment’ in European civilization history; it has been the first in an Islamic community. Are there any other countries in the world which were founded by fighting against both internal and external powers? … Unfortunately, the Armenian and Greek diasporas continue their struggles in Europe and the USA today. The struggle between the powers of Lausanne and Sevres is updated… The USA is persisting on settling in Iraq. One question: Will the USA settle in Northern Iraq to be friends with Turkey, or to divide Anatolia? … The question becomes hotter day by day; does the USA want to found a puppet Kurdish state in Iraq which would be affiliated to it in fact? Does our ‘strategic partner’ persist on dominating Iraq to set the Anatolian people at odds with each other? … Is the Iraq War of the USA an implicit war against Turkey in fact?”*

The common intertextuality in Kemalist discourse again works in this quotation. Kemalism is supposed to be the ideological mental framework that transforms Anatolian Muslim society into an enlightened, secular, rational, European society. In the article, Selcuk mentions how Kemalists succeeded in this transformation despite internal and external enemies. In a nutshell, in the Kemalist narrative of nation building, signing the Sèvres Treaty after World War One by the Ottomans was a betrayal as the acceptance of selling and dividing the country. After the victory of the Independence War against external European powers and internal powers, Kemalists replaced it with the Lausanne Treaty in the 1920s. At the same time, they were faced with local Islamic resistance to the state authority of Kemalist central government. With a departure from this national history, he questions whether the USA, with its allies in Europe and Turkey, are implicitly in a war against Turkey to divide the country. What is more, his way of describing the “Armenian and Greek Diasporas” gives evidence of how Kemalists perceive non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, essentially as the treacherous enemy within. This discourse analysis reveals that this specific Kemalist identification and world view reflects their interpretation of Turkey’s current internal and external relations. Findings strongly verify the interconnectivity of national identity and anti-Americanism discourse, and demonstrate how they reproduce each other.

Emre Kongar (Cumhuriyet 11.09.2006, p.3) argued that Americans were trying to understand how the largest public opinion against the USA was formed in Turkey. He saw this phenomenon as the result of the USA’s faults. The first wrong step Washington took was in Turkey in empowering Islamists and bringing them to power in 2002. Thus, secular and democratic governmental structure in Turkey was sacrificed to the *moderate Islamic model*for the short-term interests. Islamists already had anti-American political and ideological feelings. In the meantime, the USA faced the opposition of modernist groups who were in favor of a secular and democratic governmental structure as they supported the moderate Islamic state model. As a result, no one was left to look at the USA through objective eyes. This image of the USA referred to a direct connection with the domestic power struggle in Turkey while portraying the AKP as a part of the USA’s strategic project in the Middle East. Therefore, anti-imperialist Kemalist pro-secularists tended to be sovereign-nationalist anti-American with a belief of the Islamist government was backed by the USA.

1. The interest-based discourse of liberal version of Turkish anti-Americanism

Beyond Kemalist anti-war discourse, in *Hurriyet*’s coverage there were some columnists who lost their ethical perspectives on war (Deveci and Kejanlioglu 2005) and considered it as a means of profit (Hurriyet, 11.12.2002, p.10):

*“There is a single title for the bargaining between Bush in Washington and Tayyip Erdogan: ‘Take the bases, give the EU!’ or ‘Take the EU, give the bases!’… Turkey will open its bases and the USA will increase its pressure on the EU! … It is evident that, Tayyip Erdogan doesn’t show a negative attitude against these wishes of Bush in order to empower himself for the EU. In the meantime, Bush considers Tayyip Erdogan within the perspective of September 11th, and mostly within the framework of a meeting and a consent between ‘Islamic-Christian’ civilizations … Soldier, base, land, here’s the issue, here is the fate.”*

In the excerpt above, Yalcin Dogan argued that it was time to persuade Turkey. He believes that the fate of the country was linked to the triangle of the USA–EU–Turkey and the binary of Islam-Christianity after the events of 9/11. This point also demonstrated why Turkish government was reluctant to say “no” to the USA’s demands.

The text introduces three cases of interdiscursivity that need to be underlined. One concerns the interdiscursivity with the discourse on *pragmatism* which is considered as a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy regarding its relations with the USA, including the EU. The second one entails the interdiscursivity with *the post 9/11 paradigm* that reviews the importance of Turkey's Muslim identity in international politics and its meaning for a Christian Western civilization seeking a moderate role model for other Islamic countries. It changed Turkey's position within the framework of “the clash of civilizations” (Huntington 2002) and main references changed from being Western and secular to being Muslim and democratic (Tank 2006 p.468). The third one relates to *realism*, found to be in Turkey's rational approach towards the West where foreign policy is seen as the arena of seeking to maximize nation-state interests. This realist perspective of foreign policy reproduces the hegemony of the USA power in international politics and its role in Turkey's relations with the EU, which does not challenge it.

In this sense, the best seller *Hurriyet* newspaper columnists seemed to be taking a realist, interest-based approach to Turkey’s role in the Middle East and the world. For instance, Cuneyt Ulsever noted (Hurriyet 26.12.2002, p.7) that life meant energy and trade. This was portrayed as inevitable logic in the emerging global world at the beginning of the 21st century. He believed, whether Turkey participated or not, that the USA’s efforts would determine new geographical borders. Turkey would take an active role in establishing the new order in the Middle East. This example shows Turkey's search for a new role and identity in changing international circumstances of the region.

Like Ulsever, Mehmet Ali Birand’s (Hurriyet, 09.01.2003, p.5) contribution to the debate supported the realist, interest-based perspective on the Iraq War:

*“Turkey will either cooperate with the USA in accordance with its own interests and not participate in unproductive bargains and thus will have a voice in the new order; or will be stuck within in-party conflicts, unproductive reactions of Arabic countries and ideological incentives. There is not a middle way for this.”*

Birand believed that the USA was establishing the new order which would change the Middle East and make it unrecognizable. Washington settled into a region of the world with the Afghanistan operation after September 11th. It was the turn of the Middle East. He underlined Turkey had to think “great” and see all the dimensions of this situation. With a departure from this point, he draws attention to the fact that Turkey was face to face with a basic preference. In the expression of topos of new order, Birand imagined Turkey as a pivotal country in its neighborhood and defined taking sides with the Arabs as a suicide for the AKP and Turkey. Apparently, he portrayed Turkey as the Western country of the Middle East (Hurriyet 25.03.2011, p.8) and stressed on that Turkey should chose its side.

As was indicated in the previous excerpts, *Hurriyet* columnists seemed to support allying with the USA in shaping newly emerging Iraq and the Middle East. However, the news reports in dealing with Iraq turned out to be critical of the situation. It was highlighted that the bond between El-Qaeda-Saddam, which the USA showed as an excuse for its invasion of Iraq, was never revealed. The number of soldiers the USA army lost in Iraq had extended beyond the number of the people killed in terror attacks organized in the USA on 11 September 2001 (Hurriyet, 27.12.2006, p.7). It was questioned how the USA had turned the world upside down for eight years after the attacks of September 11th . Moreover, it was underlined that the world still had doubts about this greatest destruction. Hurriyet reported that (11.09.2008, p.6) the USA’s President Bush invaded this country claiming that it brought “freedom and democracy to Iraq”. But the situation was that more than one million people lost their lives in Iraq in five years, more than four thousand American soldiers were killed and more than thirty-thousand were injured.

1. The identity-based approach of the islamist version of Turkish anti-americanism

Contrary to the Westernist perspective of liberal Turkish nationalism, the Islamist writers exhibited an identity-based approach by defining that the red line of Turkey was fighting against the Muslims and Arabs. Ali Bulac (Zaman, 08.11.2010 p.6 ) constructed a collective ‘we’ discourse for Muslims in noting Turkey could take decisions against the Islamic and Arab world or participate in such opposing alliances, but could never be a fighter against the Muslims. He addressed the common past for justification of his argumentation: “Mustafa Kemal, who knew what Yavuz meant to do, was aware that Turkey had to avoid fighting against the Muslims and Arabs despite the fact that the New Turkish Republic put its Islamic history aside and put great distances between itself and the Arab world.” This statement reinforced the Islamic character of the Turkish nation and its continuity from Ottoman times to the present day. On these opinions, he concluded that the same religious sentiments caused the rejection of the Permit of 1 March 2003 in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

It is important to note that this *culturalist* discourse, based on blaming Kemalists for positioning Turkey far from the Islamic world, was used to reconstruct the AKP’s foreign policy and to redefine Turkey's role in the world. It can be said that this argument represented Davutoglu’s *Strategic Depth* vision (2001) in Turkish foreign policy. In *Zaman,* it was argued (26.05.2007 p.7) that neither the USA nor another power could shape Iraq and the region. Certainly, Turkey could; but Turkey could manage this by trying other methods and ways such as improving economic, cultural and historical relations. The importance of soft power and diplomacy in new Turkish foreign policy was indicated with a stress on developing other methods and instruments in relation to Iraq. More noteworthy, “Turkey can do what other powers cannot do” argumentation signalled how Islamists mapped Turkey as a regional pivotal power that was capable of reshaping Iraq and the region. The concepts of civilizational geopolitics represent Turkey’s “new geographic imagination” (Aras and Fidan 2009) under the AKP government. In this new geographic imagination Turkey is located outside Western civilization and it is imagined as the leader of its own civilization, which changes the definitions of us and others (Bilgin and Bilgic 2011 p.173).

On the Islamist side, the Iraq War was covered by *Zaman* from a remarkable anti-American Islamist perspective, but with different political motivations and justifications from the pro-secularist newspapers. In the next text, Ali Bulac (20.11.2004, p.7) noted that the situation was sufficient to meet the legal definition of genocide in Iraq. In this discourse, negative predication of Americans as the ‘out-group’ was a dominant strategy that was alienating the USA, even demonizing it:

*“The cruelty a Muslim society is exposed to, has now reached horrible levels. Occupation forces are slaughtering kids, women, elderly and civil people regardless of any religious day. They invade the mosques, destroy Allah’s homes and cruelly kill the ones crawling on the ground in pain. While leaving Vietnam, American soldiers had raped hundreds of thousands of women. Now they are raping* *tens of thousands of Muslim women in Iraq.”*

In these representations of the Iraq War, the references to the Q’uran, Allah, Muslim women and mosques reminded the readers that they were members of a Muslim nation and discursively strengthen this feeling of belonging. In these linguistic expressions, the Islamist “we” identification was for Muslims as opposed to the “they” identification as that of Americans and Christians. According to him, the battle between civilizations was realized on the Muslim lands. Bulac supported his arguments by giving images from Iraq such as American soldiers put crosses on their tanks, insulted the Q’uran or swept over the sacred feelings of Muslims disrespectfully and with hatred. “Sick culture” of Americans was polluting Islamic sacred beliefs. Moreover, the writer referred to American President George W. Bush's fundamentalist Christian identity. It was argued when Bush mentioned the word *crusade* twice, that he didn’t use this word coincidentally or for any other reason apart from its literal meaning. Consequently, this Islamist discourse reproduced cultural anti-American discourse in Turkey through the Iraq War coverage.

To have a deeper understanding of Islamist definition of “we”, the following text presents a justification of the argument in noting “we feel responsible for other Muslims in Turkey’s socio-cultural geography” (Zaman 27.01.2007, p.5). In the text, the borders of Turkey’s socio-cultural geography are mapped in the Balkans, Caucasians, Middle Asia, the whole of the Middle East and the middle of Africa. This definition of geography is based on the Islamic historical past of the nation in the Ottoman Empire lands of Anatolia, Middle East, North Africa, Balkans and Caucasians. But, The USA, as a non-Muslim power, is defined as the ‘other’, a foreign power in Turkey’s historical geography:

*“Political geography of Turkey is as defined in the National Pact; socio-cultural geography extends to Balkans, Caucasians, Middle Asia, whole of the Middle East and the middle of Africa. All pleasant and unpleasant events on this geography have an influence on our people. We feel sorry for a Caucasian tribe, to the people of Palestine and Iraq just as we feel sorry for Bosnia. We feel responsible for all this geography. The region is under the invasions and pressures of foreign powers today; this increases anger in Turkey. What does feeling sorry for the people of Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq have to do with ‘ethnic nationalism’ or ‘racist* *chauvinism’.”*

This text discursively constructs Islamist understanding of “our people” based on the aforementioned Turkey’s socio-cultural geography. This image of Turkey relocates it in its neighborhood and inspires new Turkish Foreign Policy in a redefinition of who are the foreigners of the nation. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s culturalist *Strategic Depth* (2001) perspective on Turkish Foreign Policy has brought redefinitions in Turkey’s international identity and its relationship with other nations. Davutoglu argued that Turkey should not insist on being Western. It embraces Turkey’s position at the crossroads of civilizations and targets to embrace Turkey’s political, economic and cultural reach within multilateral foreign policy and rhythmic diplomacy. This vision entailed rehabilitation of the Ottoman era in a way predicated on two pillars of *historical depth* and *geographical depth* (Fisher-Onar 2011).

1. The value-based discourse of liberal-leftist version of Turkish anti-americanism

Beyond all these interest-identity accounts on the war against Iraq, the ethical and legal dimensions of the war were considered by *Radikal* newspaper (İnsel, 30.12.2002). Fuat Keyman (Radikal 23.02.2003 p.5) assumed that Turkey might not choose to support American policies in Iraq. By using a *value-based* approach, Keyman criticized American foreign policy’s discourse on the global fight against terrorism which was just security and military based, while the USA was disregarding serious global problems. He rationalized his ethical argument based on a consideration of international law and norms. According to him, the USA polarised the world as “we/friends” and “others/enemies” to empower its hegemony and unilateral world vision. After 9/11, American foreign policy makers in the Bush period imposed a mentality of “I am powerful, I am right” in international organizations such as the United Nations and the NATO. What was more outstanding in his remarks was the point that addressed the lack of legitimacy in the USA’s intervention in Iraq. Based on this, he argued the matter was not just peculiar to the case of Iraq, but also this illegitimate war constituted a problem for the existence and role of international organizations and law in the new world order and new power relations.

The USA Senate issued a report on Iraq in July 2004 and stated that all information presented by the intelligence services such as the CIA as an excuse for the invasion were false. Neither weapons of mass destruction nor any bond between Saddam and El-Qaeda were detected. The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* newspapers somehow confessed that they had become an instrument in an unfair invasion and manipulated the society. While these newspapers published the news coming from the White House on their front pages, they didn’t give much attention to counter information or opinions, thus they played an important role in the invasion by influencing and manipulating public opinion for supporting the war in Iraq. Considering these facts and news from Iraq, Turkish newspapers kept anti-American discourse during the Iraq War.

Different from other newspapers, the liberal leftist *Radikal*  held a different stand regarding the reactions to the pains of Iraq war. Radikal’s columnist Alkan (03.09.2004, p.4) argued that the interest-based approach might be left and a value-based approach might be taken to the tragedies experienced by different groups of people in different parts of the world without any religion-based discrimination of identities:

*“We must show reaction against the tragedies experienced in the USA, Iraq and Russia. It is not enough just to criticize the war and the pains the USA keeps going in Iraq. We must be able to criticize the children taken hostage in Ossetia, in the same manner. If we keep praising Hitler and Osama bin Laden when it serves our benefits, we’ll witness the slaughter of more children and the murder of workers from Nepal, just because of the fact that they are Buddhists, destruction of the twin towers, Madımak Hotel and the expansion of the belief that Islamism is a religion that hugs terrorism. And we’ll be responsible for all these to some extent.”*

All in all, the data analysis demonstrated that the USA image as a foreign “other” can unite different discourses of Turkish anti-Americanism. Apart from the fact that they had different motivations for opposition to the USA hegemony in the Middle East, dominant discourse was anti-American and anti-war discourse.

1. Conclusion

This study demonstrated the concept of anti-Americanism embedded in the Turkish news discourse on the Iraq War. First, it focused on representations of the decision-making process on Turkey’s role in Iraq, then moved to Turkish media coverage of Iraq War. By doing so, the discourse analysis traced different conceptualizations of Turkey's inter-national identity, including its Western, Middle Eastern, Muslim and secular identities. In this way, it argued that there are competing Turkish national identity discourses which form different versions of Turkish anti-Americanism and map Turkey’s relations with the USA in various ways. By making a critical discourse analysis it showed that there are at least four different discourses of Turkish Anti-Americanism: the security-based discourse of Kemalist sovereign- nationalist Anti-Americanism; the interest-based discourse of Liberal version of Turkish Anti-Americanism; the identity-based approach of the Islamist version of Turkish Anti-Americanism; the value-sased discourse of Liberal-Leftist version of Turkish Anti-Americanism.

Representation of the Iraq War in the media involved representing boundaries which marked inclusion and exclusion, or who belonged to the “we” discourse. In the case of the Iraq War this study showed that the USA as the common “other” united the different Turkish nationalist discourses on anti-Americanism during that war. *Cumhuriyet* aimed to maintain Kemalist secular character of the Turkish nation-state against internal and external “threats”. Thus, in the chosen time period the Kemalist version of Turkish anti-Americanism was rooted in the security-based approach that suggested its domestic other, the AKP, was backed by the USA. The pro-Islamist newspaper’s discourse and new state discourse of Turkey constructed a sameness discourse and stressed on common cultural and historical roots between Muslim countries. Based on these argumentations, Islamist version of Turkish anti-Americanism showed itself within the identity-based approach which was built upon an Islam-Christianity distinction in *Zaman* newspaper. Moreover, liberal-leftist Turkish nationalism demonstrated its anti-American sentiment within the “No to War” discourse in *Radikal* by holding a value-based approach in a consideration of international law and norms. Lastly, the interest-based approach to the Iraq war and Turkey-USA relations were detected by the discourse analysis of *Hurriyet*’s coverage. As a conclusion, this study showed that there are different versions of Turkish anti-Americanism based on domestic power struggles between different discourses of Turkish nationalism.

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Özet

Türkiye’deki rakip milliyetçilik ve Amerikan-karşıtlığı söylemleri:

Irak Savaşı örneği

ABD’deki 11 Eylül Olaylarından beri, akademik çalışmalar İslam dünyasının Amerikalıları ve Amerikan dış politikasını nasıl gördüğünü sorgulamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye nüfusun yüzde 90’ının kendini Amerikan-karşıtı olarak tanımlamasıyla Müslüman ülkeler arasında önde gelmektedir. Bu çalışma, farklı Türk milliyetçiliği söylemlerinin güç mücadelesine bağlı olarak Türkiye’de Amerikan-karşıtlığının farklı türleri olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu Amerikan-karşıtlıklarının neden olduğunu, nereden geldiklerini, birbiriyle ilişkilerini ve mücadelerini daha iyi anlamak için Viyana Okulu’nun söylem-tarihsel yaklaşımını kullanarak ABD’nin Irak Savaşı’nın Türk medyasındaki temsillerini analiz etmektedir.

*Anahtar kelimeler:* Amerikan-Karşıtlığı, Türk milliyetçiliği, Irak Savaşı, Türk medyası, söylem analizi.