Staff rotation, connection building and intermediaries in corrupt transactions

Güzin Bayar

Abstract


Corruption has been a major problem in many societies throughout history. There is an extensive literature about the ways to discourage corruption, with staff rotation being one of the suggestions given. This article primarily focuses on the effect of staff rotation on corrupt transactions, although it also considers other factors, like connection building and use of intermediaries, which facilitate corrupt transactions. The roles of staff rotation, connection building and intermediaries are examined in three different settings: a stage game without intermediaries, an infinitely repeated game without intermediaries, and a game with intermediaries. Results suggest that staff rotation, increased penalties and a clean image of public office can be effective anti-corruption policy tools. Existence of intermediaries or a long term interaction between officers and the clients can solve time inconsistencies, thus, some corrupt transactions, which are not implementable otherwise, become feasible.

 


Keywords


Corruption, Staff Rotation, Intermediaries, Connections, Bribe

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